At the end of June, the great belligerents gathered for a peace conference in Lusaka, Zambia. They agreed to a ceasefire, prisoner exchanges and other peace-making arrangements, but not all rebel groups were present at the conference and others refused to sign. Even before the agreement became official, Rwanda and Uganda split and their rebel groups began fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In accordance with the agreement negotiated by South Africa, Congolese President Joseph Kabila will remain the interim head of state until the elections in about 30 months. However, the Lusaka Agreement meets the demands of rebels and their supporters, including Rwandans, by recognizing their promise to disarm the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in the Great Lakes region. But the current fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani shows that the security interests of these countries, which were to protect their intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, are not the only motivation for the war. There are no Rwandan or Ugandan rebel groups in Kisangani that could justify the presence of the armies of both countries. Instead, the conflict appears to be a struggle for commercial influence, to control diamond, gold and coffee concessions, and for political influence in the region after the end of the war. Since the beginning of the war, the fragility of the Congolese state has been exploited by all foreign forces, allies or enemies of the Kabila government. For the first time, the Lusaka agreement has put the Congolese internal agenda back at the centre of its concerns. If the ceasefire agreement is not implemented, continued violence could delay the national dialogue, which is essential for sending a peacekeeping force, withdrawing foreign troops, training a new Congolese army and re-establishing a public administration on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Until the military situation is resolved, it is unlikely that the Congolese will be responsible for their own destiny.

Tshisekedi must find a fragile local balance. While virtually all copper and cobalt revenues, which account for more than 80% of the Democratic Republic of Congo`s exports (see Appendix F), come from the katanga region provinces, its political party has close ties to the Kasai region. Indeed, in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba, its political support is primarily the responsibility of the large population of Caseaise origin. On the other hand, Joseph Kabila and the main opposition leader, both from Katanga, enjoy the support of different parts of the non-Casaic population. [fn] See crisis Group Statement, “A Nuanced but Firm Political Approach for DR Congo`s Decisive Autumn,” September 15, 2016.Hide Footnote To be sure, Tshisekedi received an unexpected boost when Antoine Gabriel Kyungu Wa Kumwanza, former governor of Katanga and current member of the Upper Katanga Provincial Assembly, whose party is firmly rooted in the Katanga region, became the first great voice of katanga; Although Kyungu was originally in Katumbi camp, he supported Tshisekedi. [fn] Marie-France Cros, “Kyungu rallies to Tshisekedi: the Lamuka opposition is divided,” La Libre Afrique, 28 January 2019; In June 2020, Minister Kyungus approved the appointment of Kyenge as ceo of the national railway company, which had been pending for a year, as part of the same package of measures that Kyenge became ceo of G├ęcamines.